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In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,' the United States
Supreme Court unanimously held that "[a] court may assert general jurisdiction
over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all
claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so 'continuous and
systematic' as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.",2 Rejecting

Translated roughly, the phrase means "my house is your house."
**Collyn Peddie is an appellate lawyer with the Law Offices of Collyn Peddie in Houston,
Texas. She was counsel of record for respondents during the merits stage of Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations,S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (2011), in the United States Supreme Court. For
more information, go to collynpeddie.com. The author wishes to thank Professors Phillip Blumberg
and Kurt Strasser for their advice and critical assistance in the case, and Professor Lea Brilmayer for
her invaluable scholarship.
1.
131 S.Ct. 2846 (2011).
Id. at 2851. "When a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not
2.
arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum, the State has been said to be
exercising 'general jurisdiction' over the defendant." Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 (1984) (citing Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process
Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 77, 80-81 (1980); Arthur T. von
Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L.
REv. 1121, 1136-44 (1966); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 786 (1984)).
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the Goodyear petitioners' call to announce a bright line rule that would have
restricted eneral jurisdiction over foreign corporations to places where they are
''present," ordinarily only a corporation's principal place of business and state
of incorporation, the Court nevertheless failed to define, for future cases, what it
meant by "essentially at home," 4 a phrase it has used in no other context.
This Article explores the possible reasons why the Court utilized this novel
standard and its implications. It posits that, by understanding the origins of the
"essentially at home" standard and why the Court did what it did and did not do
what it had the opportunity to do, it may be possible to discover how that
standard may be satisfied in future cases. In particular, this Article focuses on a
question the Court left on the cutting-room floor-whether wholly owned
subsidiaries, when serving as part of a single, highly-integrated business
may "fairly be
enterprise orchestrated by their co-defendant parent corporation,
5
regarded as at home" in their corporate parent's "home" state.
In concluding that they may, this Article first explores the Goodyear case in
considerable depth, focusing on Goodyear's highly-integrated supply and
distribution system, and identifies the facts and circumstances that may have led
the Supreme Court to refine its traditional test for the exercise of general
jurisdiction to allow for flexibility when courts are faced with new and novel
corporate structures. Second, it provides a primer on enterprise theory as it
applies to jurisdictional analysis after Goodyear. Finally, this Article examines
Supreme Court jurisprudence, including the Goodyear opinion itself, the Court's
parallel decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,6 as well as circuit
court cases decided after Goodyear, in an attempt to identify the origins of the
essentially at home standard and to assess whether the Court will hold in some
future case that enterprise theories provide a means to find foreign corporations
essentially at home where their corporate relatives reside.
Against this backdrop, the Goodyear decision can fairly be read as what it
is-a new marker at the jurisdictional trailhead, portending more twists and turns
in future cases-and not, as portrayed by some commentators, a "very easy
case," 7 the obituary for general jurisdiction, or merely the stuff of which bad law
school exam questions are made.

3.
See Brief for Petitioners at 14, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.
Ct. 2846 (No. 10-76), 2010 WL 4624153 at *14.
4.
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
5.
See id. at 2854, 2857.
6.
131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
7.
Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of "Essentially at Home" in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L.
REv. 527, 527 (2012). A total of twelve North Carolina judges found that there was no
constitutional impediment to that state's exercise of general jurisdiction over Goodyear's foreign
subsidiaries. Two trial judges heard the jurisdictional motions. See, e.g., Brown v. Meter, 681
S.E.2d 382, 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), discretionary appeal not allowed, 695 S.E.2d 756 (N.C.
2010), rev'd sub nom. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
It was then reviewed by a three-judge panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, id., and then
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GooDYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S.A. v. BROWN

A.

JurisdictionalFacts

There is scant discussion in the Court's opinion in Goodyear of the facts in
that case. 8 This is due, in part, to the fact that the record in the case can only
generously be described as skeletal. There was but one deposition taken in the
case and very few documents produced. 9 The lack of factual discussion may
also be the result of the strategically-superficial question the Goodyear
petitioners presented to the Supreme Court, which required little detailed factual
analysis and focused primarily on the court of appeals' imprecise use of "stream
of commerce" analysis.' 0 It may also be the result of the parsimonious use of
such facts in the briefs of the Goodyear petitioners and their supporting amici.
Nevertheless, as argued below, the facts of the case may have had an impact on
the standard that the Court chose to impose and on its decision to leave for
another day the question of the circumstances under which a foreign subsidiary
may be found to be essentially at home in the corporate home of its parent. For
these reasons, it is important to understand what was before the Court when it
ruled.
On April 18, 2004, thirteen-year-olds Julian Brown, Matt Helms, and their
youth soccer teammates rode on a bus to Charles de Gaulle Airport to begin their
journey home to North Carolina." Outside Paris, a tire on that bus blew out

"reviewed"

again by the seven-judge Supreme Court of North Carolina which declined
discretionary review, Brown v. Meter, 695 S.E.2d 756 (N.C. 2010).
8. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850.
9.
See Joint Appendix at 221, Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (No. 10-76). Nevertheless, as
demonstrated below, that deposition contained some key admissions. See infra text accompanying
notes 21-23.
10. The Goodyear petitioners' "Question Presented," to the Supreme Court, and the one on
which the Court granted certiorari, is as follows: "Whether a foreign corporation is subject to
general personal jurisdiction, on causes of action not arising out of or related to any contacts
between it and the forum state, merely because other entities distribute in the forum state products
initially placed in the stream of commerce by the corporation." Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3,
at i. By contrast, and mindful of Supreme Court Rule 24(1)(a), the Goodyear respondents restated
the question in their merits brief as follows: "Whether foreign-based subsidiaries of an American
corporation that choose to become part of an ongoing and highly-integrated business enterprise
operating within the forum may evade that state's general personal jurisdiction even though they
regularly sell tens of thousands of their products through that enterprise in the forum state?" Brief
for Respondents at i, Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (No. 10-76), 2010 WL5125441 at *i.
11. These facts and some that follow are set forth in the trial court's order, which is
unreported. The trial court's order, along with the opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals,
was, however, attached to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Goodyear as part of the Petitioners'
Appendix. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at iv, app. B at 31a Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (No. 10-76) [hereinafter Petitioners' Appendix], available at
http://www.jonesdayappellate.com/files/CaseStudy/94lebb9e-9853-45cd-al9a81 ele0bbd60l/Presentation/CaseStudyFile/b27f86b4-93c8-4365-9d53824f475e0642/GoodyearBrown10TermCERT.pdf; see also, Brown v. Meter, No. 05 CVS 1922,
2008 WL 8187601 (N.C. Gen. Ct. J. Super Ct. Div. Apr. 25, 2008).
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when its plies allegedly improperly separated. 12 The speeding bus left the
highwa', hit a concrete wall, and overturned, killing Matt Helms and Julian
Brown.
The tire that led to Julian's and Matt's deaths was manufactured in Turkey
by Goodyear Lastikleri T.A.S. (Goodyear Lastikleri), designed in Luxembourg
by Goodyear Luxembourg Tires, S.A. (Goodyear Luxembourg), and sold in
France through
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. (Goodyear
14
Operations).
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (Goodyear) owned 100% of the stock of
all three petitioner corporations at the time of the accident. 15 Goodyear also had
deep ties to North Carolina 6:it had been registered to do business in North
Carolina since 1956, long maintained a registered agent in Raleigh, North
Carolina, and owned and operated three large tire and tire-mold7 manufacturing
plants in Fayetteville, Statesville, and Asheboro, North Carolina.'
Both families sought relief from Goodyear's foreign subsidiaries and
Goodyear itself "on a number of theories arising from [the] alleged negligent
design, construction, testing, and inspection of and a failure to warn about
alleged latent defects in the.., tire in question."' 18 Goodyear did not contest the
North Carolina trial court's assertion of general personal jurisdiction over it. 19
The evidence in the case revealed that the Goodyear subsidiaries did not
conduct their global tire business as autonomous and free-standing businesses.
Instead, the trial court found that the Goodyear parent controlled and performed
key portions of their business:
The defendants, as manufacturers, did not have their own
distribution system for the sale of their tires, but instead used their
Goodyear parent and affiliated companies to distribute
the tires they
20
manufactured to the United States and North Carolina.

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 384, 387-88 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), discretionary
appeal not allowed, 695 S.E.2d 756 (N.C. 2010), rev'd sub nom. Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 202, 236;
Petitioners' Appendix, supra note 11, at 32a.
15. See Petitioners' Appendix, supra note 11, at 34a.
16. Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 121.
17. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 10, at 5 & n.2 (citing NORTH CAROLINA
DEPARTMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.secretary.state.nc.us/corporations/Corp.

aspx?Pitemld=5030445 (last visited Feb. 2, 2012) (listing for "Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company")); id. at n.3 (referencing North Carolina property tax records).
18. Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 384.
19. See id. at 382.
20. Petitioners' Appendix, supra note 11, at 33a.
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As one witness explained: "Their job is to be given a forecast or a ticket and they
just build widgets.",21 Thus, the Goodyear petitioners "would not deal directly
with customers or bring tires into the United States without [Goodyear's]
approval or sanction." 22 As a result, when Goodyear Lastikleri shipped tires to
North Carolina, it shipped them solely through Goodyear's "internal
The
distribution" network and only at its corporate parent's request. 23
distribution process was the same for Goodyear Luxembourg's and Goodyear
Operations' products.24 In sum, none of the Goodyearpetitioners' products ever
left the Goodyear "internal distribution" system until after they reached North
Carolina.
During the relevant period, the Goodyear petitioners manufactured more
than 44,000 tires which they sold in North Carolina through the Goodyear
"internal distribution" process enterprise described above. 25 However, the trial
court concluded that the number of tires shipped to and sold in
North Carolina by
26
the Goodyearpetitioners was actually "substantially higher."
What becomes clear from this quick review of the jurisdictional evidence in
Goodyear, is that the foreign subsidiaries did not of their own free will merely
place tires they manufactured in the "unpredictable currents or eddies, 27 of the
"stream of commerce," resulting in those products' serendipitous arrival in the
North Carolina forum, as the petitioners in Goodyear and their supporting amici
argued. 28 Nor did they merely turn their products over to Goodyear distributors,
independent or otherwise, with whom they had contracted to perform that
service. Instead, the Goodyear petitioners acted as functionaries of their
corporate parent who fulfilled the design and manufacturing parts of the overall
Goodyear production and distribution process for products delivered in North
Carolina only pursuant to orders from their corporate parent emanating from
North Carolina, based on solicitations made by the parent in North Carolina. At
the express direction of the parent, and according to the established Goodyear
"internal" distribution scheme, these subsidiaries placed their products, stamped
only as "Goodyear" tires, in what amounts to a fixed distribution pipeline, with

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 256.
Id. at279.
Id. at255.
Id. at 269-70, 294.
Id. at 293-94.
The trial court found:
The number of tires shipped into North Carolina from each of these manufacturers
may actually be substantially higher, in that [tihe Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Company... after being noticed for a 30(b)(6) deposition, failed to determine how many
vehicles equipped with tires from these foreign defendant manufacturers are imported
into the U.S. and shipped into North Carolina for sale each year.
Petitioners' Appendix, supra note 11, at 33a.
27. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 117 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
28. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 6, 58 (stating that the petitioners did not
target North Carolina or even have knowledge that their products were being sold there).
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fixed entry points at their respective plants and a fixed endpoint in North
Carolina.
B.

The Trial Court's Order

The trial court, in its order exercising general personal jurisdiction over [the
Goodyear petitioners], never used the term "stream of commerce." Not once.
Instead, using the traditional test for the exercise of general jurisdiction, it made
four key conclusions of law: 1) "defendants have continuous and systematic ties
with the State of North Carolina;" 2) "[d]efendants activities in North Carolina
are substantial;" 3) the quantity, nature, and quality of their contacts as well as
North Carolina's interest in the case, and convenience of the parties all "weigh in
favor of the exercise of general jurisdiction over the defendants;" and 4) the
"exercise of general jurisdiction over the defendants comports with due process
29
and does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.,
In support of these conclusions, the trial court highlighted Goodyear's
highly-integrated business model. 30 The court found that the Goodyear
petitioners' substantial tire sales in North Carolina through the Goodyear
enterprise, the revenue the Goodyear petitioners derived from them, the "quality
of those contacts, which include systematic and repeated contacts with the state
of North Carolina for the purpose of commerce, along with the [Goodyear
petitioners] ownership by [a] U.S. corporation[] doing substantial business in
North Carolina, weigh[ed] in favor of a finding of general jurisdiction over the
[Goodyearpetitioners] .' 31
C. The North Carolina Court of Appeals' Opinion

In reviewing the trial court's order, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
asked "whether the trial court's findings of fact support its legal conclusions that
Defendants had 'continuous and systematic contacts with North Carolina'
thereby justifying the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over
Defendants. ,,32 It then discussed the factors the North Carolina courts have
traditionally considered in determining whether such contacts exist.
The court stated that, in assessing the Goodyear petitioners' contacts with
North Carolina, it was required to insure that those contacts resulted from
"actions by Defendant[s] rather than from mere happenstance or coincidence or

29. Petitioners' Appendix, supra note 11, at 35a-36a.
30. Id. at 33a-35a.
31. Id. at34a-35a.
32. Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 388 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), discretionary appeal not
allowed, 695 S.E.2d 756 (N.C. 2010), rev'd sub nom. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
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Unfortunately, in evaluating those contacts, the court

took a mystifying detour.
The court apparently responded to language, adopted by North Carolina's
courts from Hanson v. Denckla,34 utilizing the "purposeful availment" concept

for the limited purpose of assessing whether, in the general jurisdiction context,
contacts could be attributed to a foreign defendant or were, instead, the

"unilateral" acts of someone else. 35 It then engaged in what can be characterized
as extended dicta in discussing that standard as used in World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson,36 for assessing whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction

over a foreign defendant offends due process. It may have been in the more
limited, Hanson context, however, that the court asked whether the Goodyear

petitioners had "purposefully injected [their] product into the stream of
commerce without any indication that [they] desired to limit
the area of
37
distribution of [their] product so as to exclude North Carolina.,

The court's apparent concern for attribution of contacts becomes clear when
it questions certain trial court findings and concludes that the Goodyear

petitioners were not "directly" responsible for their tires' presence in North
Carolina because they were not "directly" responsible for the distribution and
sale of any of their own products anywhere in the United States.38 Instead, those

core corporate functions fell exclusively to Goodyear.
In finding that the evidence supported the trial court's findings, the court

explained: "[T]hrough a regular process employed within the Goodyear
organization, a substantial number of tires manufactured by the Defendants were
imported into the United States and distributed to various entities in North
Carolina." 39
The court, therefore, found that the Goodyear petitioners
"purposefully and intentionally" placed their products in the Goodyear

33. Id. at 388-89.
34. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). "[I]t is essential in each case that there be
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State ..... Id. at 253 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945)).
35. Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 389 (citing and quoting Lulla v. Effective Minds, LLC, 646 S.E.2d
129, 133 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); Adams, Kleemeier, Hagan,
Hannah & Fouts, PLLC v. Jacobs, 581 S.E.2d 798, 802, (N.C. Ct. App. 2003), rev'd on other
grounds, 588 S.E.2d 465 (N.C. 2003)).
36. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
37. Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 391 (alterations in original) (quoting Bush v. BASF Wyandotte
Corp., 306 S.E.2d 562, 568 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)). That
limitation becomes apparent when the court states, at the end of the same paragraph:
Thus, we must evaluate the validity of the trial court's decision that [Petitioners] were
subject to the jurisdiction of the Onslow County Superior Court by examining whether
the trial court's findings of fact, considered in their entirety, provide an adequate basis for
a conclusion that Defendants had "continuous and systematic contacts with North
Carolina" in light of the well-established legal principle outlined above.
Id. at 392.
38. Id. at 394; Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 223-28, 256, 279
39. Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 394.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2012

7

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 13

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 63: 697

distribution enterprise, knew or should have known that "a Goodyear affiliate
obtained tires manufactured by Defendants and sold them in the United States in
the regular course of business," and "that several thousand tires manufactured by
each of the Defendants eventually found their way into North Carolina markets
through the operation of a continuous and highly-organized distribution
process."
The North Carolina Court of Appeals could have made clear that this
"stream of commerce" discussion was limited to whether tire sales in North
Carolina could be charged to the Goodyear petitioners for jurisdictional
purposes. Although it apparently tried to do so, it did not succeed. Instead, in a
muddled paragraph that likely condemned its decision to review by the Supreme
Court, it stated:
Instead of adopting a general rule precluding the use of stream of
commerce analysis to support a finding of general personal jurisdiction,
we believe that the real issue is the extent to which Defendants'
products were, in fact, distributed in North Carolina markets.... [T]he
trial court's findings reflect that thousands of tires manufactured by each
of the Defendants were distributed in North Carolina as the result of a
highly organized distribution process that involved Defendants and
other Goodyear affiliates.4 t
On that basis, the court found "competent evidence" that the exercise of general
jurisdiction over the Goodyear petitioners in North Carolina was proper and did
not offend due process. 42
Against this backdrop, the North Carolina
•• 43 Supreme Court unanimously
refused to review the court of appeals' decision.
It should be clear that the court of appeals' decision was not, as some
commentators suggest, 44 based solely upon the number of regular sales in North
Carolina, which the lower courts admitted they did not and could not know for
sure. 45 Instead, both courts below focused on the manner in which those sales
occurred46 and the highly integrated nature of the Goodyear sales and distribution
system.

40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 394-95 (emphasis added).
42. The previous discussion reflects substantially the respondent's merits brief. See Brief for
Respondents, supra note 10, at 12-15.
43. See Brown v. Meter, 695 S.E.2d 756 (N.C. 2010).
44. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 7, at 529-30 (citing Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 390).
45. See Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 385-86.
46. See id. at 394-95; Petitioners' Appendix, supra note 11, at 33a-35a.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol63/iss3/13

8

Peddie: Mi Casa es Su Casa: Enterprise Theory and General Jurisdiction ov

2012]

ENTERPRISE THEORY AND GENERAL JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS

705

II. ENTERPRISE THEORY AND GENERAL JURISDICTION
For decades, courts across the country have found that participation in
certain highly-integrated business enterprises operating within the forum state
may subject each member, parent, or subsidiary, no matter where it is located, to
general jurisdiction in the forum.47 In finding general jurisdiction based on
enterprise and agency theories, these courts have ordinarily looked to the level of
economic integration between parent and subsidiary, instead of the legal
boundaries between them, in evaluating a corporation's contacts with the
forum.48 49 Some commentators have called this principle "jurisdictional
merger."

"[M]erger occurs when the parent and subsidiary are part of a common
enterprise that relies on the efforts of both entities to carry out a common
plan." 50 Among the factors these courts have considered as significant to
whether a common enterprise exists are: "whether the subsidiary is not an
independent decision making body; whether [its] administrative organization is
incomplete; whether the parent and subsidiary project an integrated posture to
the public; [and whether they exchange] information, personnel, and group
resources."5 1 One court described these as "plus" factors, "something 5beyond
2
the subsidiary's mere presence within the bosom of the corporate family.
Such holdings are not the rarity that they are in the Supreme Court.5 The
Fifth Circuit, for example, has upheld Texas' "single business enterprise"

47.

See, e.g., Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 912, 920-21 (9th Cir. 2011)

(finding general jurisdiction over the foreign parent under an agency theory); Stubbs v. Wyndham
Nassau Resort & Crystal Palace Casino, 447 F.3d 1357, 1363 (1 1th Cir. 2006); Ames v. Whitman's
Chocolates, No. 91-3271, 1991 WL 281798, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1991) ("General jurisdiction
does exist, however, when the parent corporation exercises such a degree of control that.., the
corporations function as one integrated enterprise.").
48. See generally PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG ET AL., BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS
§§ 24.09, 29.03-04 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing enterprise theory); see also Kurt A. Strasser & Phillip
Blumberg, Legal Form and Economic Substance of Enterprise Groups: Implications for Legal
Policy, 1 ACCOUNTING ECONOMICS & LAW: A CONVIvIUM 1, 11 (2011), available at
http://www.bepress.com/ael/voll/issl/4 (providing a summary of enterprise theory).
49. See Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal
Relations: Corporations,Conspiracies,and Agency, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 14 (1986).
50. Id. at 30 (citing PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS 67 (1983)).
Although typical merger cases arise from efforts to hold corporate parents responsible for their
subsidiaries' activities, because the doctrine merges rather than attributes their conduct, it should
also apply equally to subject subsidiaries with local parents to jurisdiction in the forum. Id. at 1314.

51. Id. at 30 (citations omitted) (citing cases).
52. Donatelli v. Nat'l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 465-66 (1st Cir. 1990).
53. A case such as Berry v. Lee, 428 F. Supp. 2d 546 (N.D. Tex. 2006), is typical. A Texas
resident sued Chinese and Korean subsidiaries in Texas, complaining of sexual harassment and
attempted rape that took place on a foreign business trip. Id. at 549-50. The plaintiff successfully
contended that the exercise of general jurisdiction over these corporations was appropriate because,
together with their Texas-based affiliates and president, they formed a "single business enterprise"
with sufficient contacts with Texas to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction over them. Id. at
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in the Third
doctrine in both the jurisdictional and liability contexts. 54 Courts
S 55
In the Third
and Seventh Circuits have also approved similar doctrines.
Circuit, numerous courts have held that "[g]eneral jurisdiction does exist when
the parent corporation exercises such a degree of control that ...the corporations
function as one integrated enterprise., 56 In the Seventh Circuit, courts may
disregard the corporate form for jurisdictional purposes under "unity of purpose"
and "alter ego" doctrines. 5 8Similarly, a Ninth Circuit panel, in Torres v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., a liability case involving facts virtually identical

555-56. The court noted first that "Berry's burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of personal
jurisdiction through alter ego and single business enterprise theories is 'less stringent' than the
standard she must meet at trial to" prove liability. Id. at 556. It then listed a number of "factors
weighing in favor of fusing the corporations" for jurisdictional purposes. Id. at 554. In doing so,
the court stated that "[n]o single factor is determinative, and the ultimate question is one of control."
Id. Judging by these standards, the court found that the local parent's ownership, control, and
portrayal to the public that all of the companies were part of a common enterprise warranted the
exercise of general jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiaries. Id. at 555-56.
54. See Fielding v. Hubert Burda Media, Inc., 415 F.3d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 2005) ("A district
court may exercise general jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation under the single business
enterprise doctrine when a subsidiary of the out-of-state corporation is subject to the court's general
jurisdiction. Typically used in the context of liability, the doctrine applies 'when corporations are
not operated as separate entities, but integrate their resources to achieve a common business
purpose."') (citing El Puerto de Liverpool v. Servi Mundo Llantero, 82 S.W.3d 622, 636 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2002)) (quoting Gardemal v. Westin Hotel Company, 186 F.3d 588, 594 (5th Cir. 1999));
Hollowell v. Orleans Reg'l Hosp. L.L.C., 217 F.3d 379, 390 (5th Cir. 2000). While Texas
recognizes the doctrine for both jurisdictional and liability purposes, see Fielding, supra, the use of
enterprise theory for jurisdictional and liability purposes are two different things. The standards and
policy considerations for determining when a court will disregard the corporate form are usually
less when the only question is whether corporations are amenable to suit in the forum. See, e.g.,
Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Walkovszky v.
Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 7 (N.Y. 1966)) (stating that the jurisdictional inquiry for piercing the
corporate veil should not require fraud, even if the test for liability does); Berry, 428 F. Supp. 2d at
556. Thus, the Texas Supreme Court recently added a fraud element to impose liability. See SSP
Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444,455 (Tex. 2008).
55. The Fifth, Third, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals rules were relevant in Goodyear
because the Goodyear petitioners alleged that it was the conflict between the decision of the North
Carolina Court of Appeals and the decisions in those circuits that warranted granting the writ of
certiorari in the Goodyear case. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (2011) (No. 10-76), 2010 WL 2786988 at *8.
56. Heinrich v. Serv. Corp. Int'l, No. 09cv0524, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62832, at *7 (W.D.
Pa. July 22, 2009) (citing Gaul v. Zep Mfg. Co., No. 03-2439, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9689, at *15
(E.D. Pa. May 26, 2004)); Ames v. Whitman's Chocolates, No. 91-3271, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18389, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1991).
57. See, e.g., Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371,
379 (7th Cir. 2008) (unity of purpose); Van Dom Co. v. Future Chemical & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d
565, 571 & n.1 (7th Cir. 1985) (alter ego); Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp.
1322, 1336 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (exercise of both general and specific jurisdiction permissible over
Japanese corporation based on "common sense" appraisal of the business relationship); Roorda v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 481 F. Supp. 868, 870-71 (D.S.C. 1979).
58. 901 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1990). The appellants in Torres sued to recover for injuries
suffered as a result of an automobile accident involving a Goodyear tire. Id. at 751. They asserted
four theories of liability, including an enterprise theory of strict products liability. Id. Goodyear
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to those in Goodyear, reversed a summary judgment order denying liability
under an enterprise theory. 59 In doing so, one of the judges observed that:
[W]e do not believe it is good law to allow multinational firms the

freedom to compartmentalize strict liability by choosing organizational
forms that will require actions for defective design of a product such as
this to be brought in Luxembourg, those for defective manufacture
in
6
Great Britain, those for defective labeling in a third, and the like. 0
In fact, North Carolina had a well-established single business enterprise rule.
In that state, "general personal jurisdiction exists over a foreign corporation
where it 'controls. .. an in-forum affiliate to such a degree that the two
corporations operate as a single, amalgamated entity."' 6 1 Quoting a leading
treatise, the Eastern District of North Carolina has stated the following:
[I]f the [affiliate] is merely an agent through which the [foreign]
company conducts business in a particular jurisdiction or its separate
corporate status is formal only and without any semblance of individual
identity, then the [in-forum affiliate's] business will be viewed as that of
the [foreign corporation] and the latter will be said to be doing business

in the jurisdiction through
the [affiliate] for purposes of asserting
62
personal jurisdiction.

Thus, where, as in Goodyear, a foreign corporation is part of a single
63
business enterprise operating in the forum, the jurisdictional analysis changes.

moved for summary judgment, which was granted. See id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the other
theories of liability but certified to the Arizona Supreme Court the issue of whether appellants could
rely on an "enterprise theory" to hold the appellee strictly liable for the appellants' injuries. Id.
(citing Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 867 F.2d 1234, 1236-37, 1239 (9th Cir. 1989)). The
Arizona Supreme Court concluded that Arizona would allow the imposition of strict liability on
trademark licensors significantly involved in Goodyear's integrated distribution process under such
a theory; therefore, following certification and the Arizona court's decision, the Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded the case. Id. (citing Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 786 P.2d 939,
945 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc)).
59. See id.
60. Id. at 754 (Noonan, J., concurring).
61. Manley v. Air Can., 753 F. Supp. 2d 551, 559 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (omission in original)
(quoting with approval In. re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 641 F. Supp. 2d 367, 382-83
(M.D. Pa. 2009)); see also Wyatt v. Walt Disney World, Co., 565 S.E.2d 705, 711 (N.C. Ct. App.
2002) (refusing to treat affiliated companies as a single entity "absent proof that the businesses are
parts of the same whole").
62. Manley, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (alterations in original) (quoting 4A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1069.4, at 174 (3d ed. 2002))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
63. For example, North Carolina has an identity caveat to its alter ego rule that would allow
controlling corporations to be held liable. See Holcomb v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 120 B.R. 35,
41 (M.D.N.C. 1990) ("[T]he North Carolina alter ego doctrine is a flexible one. Where domination
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In fact, even the Government admitted in its amicus brief in Goodyear that "a
different analysis may be warranted by the case specific interactions between
particular affiliated corporations, as when a subsidiary acts as the agent or alter
ego of the parent corporation, or vice-versa.' 64 Thus, in Donatelli v. National
Hockey League,65 which the Government cited for this notion, 66 the panel

explained when this shift occurs:
Sometimes, the parent has utilized the subsidiary in such a way that an
agency relationship between the two corporations can be perceivedand that is enough. On other occasions, jurisdiction has been premised
on a finding of control-not merely the degree of control innately
inherent in the family relationship, but the exercise of control by the
parent "greater than that normally associated with common ownership
and directorship." The same result obtains when the subsidiary is
merely an empty shell.67

Even the Supreme Court has recognized that the analysis shifts when a
single, highly-integrated business enterprise is involved. In United States v.
Scophony Corporation of America, for example, the Court held that a foreign

and control are complete, then in that 'rare' case, the court will simply disregard the corporate
fiction and treat the individuals and corporations as one party. Thus, in North Carolina an alter ego
and its subsidiary may be treated as one company."); see also Greenville Buyers Market Assocs. v.
St. Petersburg Fashions, Inc., 387 S.E.2d 234, 235 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Copley Triangle
Assocs. v. Apparel Am., Inc., 385 S.E.2d 201, 203 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989)) (noting that the acts of a
sham corporation are those of its masters for jurisdictional purposes).
64. Brief for the United Status as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 26 n.9, Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) (No. 10-76) [hereinafter Brief for
the United States], 2010 WL 4735597 at *27 n.9. Other commentators have supported this notion.
See supra text accompanying note 62, quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 62, § 1069.4, at 174;
GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS:
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 144 (2d ed. 1992) ("Some courts have considered whether

jurisdiction over a U.S. parent company also permits a U.S. court to exercise jurisdiction over
foreign subsidiaries of the parent. Lower courts have generally applied the same sort of alter ego
analysis that governs the reverse situation."); cf. United States v. Scophony Corp. of Am., 333 U.S.
795, 814-15, 818 (1948) (permitting a corporation to be "found" for venue purposes where the
corporation supervises over and intervenes in its subsidiaries operations). Had the Court applied the
appropriate jurisdictional analysis in Goodyear, it would not have found a conflict warranting
certiorari, as with the case D'Jamoos ex rel. Estate of Weingeroff v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d
94, 109 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2340 (2010). In this case, the court found that the
exercise of general jurisdiction was improper in Pennsylvania but appropriate in Colorado based on
the relationship between parent and subsidiary. Id. at 106, 109. The court explained: "[The
subsidiary] exists to conduct [the parent's] business in North and South America. Moreover, as the
exclusive.., subsidiary in the Americas ... [it] fairly could be described as the 'source of life' to
[the parent's] operations." Id. at 109.
65. 893 F.2d 459 (1st Cir. 1990).
66. Brief for the United States, supra note 64, at 26 n.9.
67. Donatelli, 893 F.2d at 466 (citations omitted) (quoting Hargrave v. Fibreboard, Corp.,
710 F.2d 1154, 1160 (5th Cir. 1983)).
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parent corporation was "found," for venue purposes under the Clayton Act, in
the United States due to its "constant supervision and intervention" in the
activities of its United States subsidiaries going well "beyond normal exercise of
shareholders' rights." 6
It should be clear then that the use of enterprise theories as a basis for the
exercise of general jurisdiction is neither a radical notion nor one with which the
Court was unfamiliar when it decided Goodyear.
I1. DOES ENTERPRISE THEORY PROVIDE FOREIGN CORPORATIONS

WITH A

JURISDICTIONAL "HOME" IN THE FORUM AFTER GOODYEAR?

When the Goodyear opinion is viewed as holding only that "[i]njecting a
product, even in substantial volume, into a forum's 'stream of commerce,'
without more, does not support general jurisdiction, ' 69 Justice Ginsburg's
opinion for the Court offers little new insight and, therefore, can be read as
containing a confounding amount of dicta, as one commentator has suggested.7 °
The opinion for the Court begins to come into sharper focus only when the case
is read in its proper context against the backdrop of its skeletal facts, of all of the
actual issues raised both by the courts below and by the Goodyear respondents,
of related Supreme Court jurisprudence, of the opinion in its sister case,
Nicastro, and of the Government's influence in the case.
A.

The Ginsburg Opinion

In the opening paragraphs of her opinion for the Court, Justice Ginsburg,
without explanation, announced as the traditional test for the exercise of general
or "all-purpose ' 71 jurisdiction over a foreign corporation what is, at the same
time, a more exacting yet potentially more broadly-applicable standard: "A court
may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country)
corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with
the State are so 'continuous and systematic' as to render them essentially at
home in the forum State. 72 A quick Westlaw search reveals no other similar use
of the phrase "essentially at home" in American jurisprudence before Goodyear.
Armed with that standard and an analysis of the few general jurisdiction
cases previously decided by the Court-Perkinsv. Benguet ConsolidatedMining

68. Scophony, 333 U.S. at 815-16, 818 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 37 (first alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting Jackson v. Tanfoglio Giuseppe, S.R.L., 615 F.3d 579, 584 (5th Cir. 2010)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
70. Stein, supra note 7, at 528.
71. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
72. Id. (emphasis added).
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74
Co.73 and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hal1 -the

majority

held that:
[P]etitioners are in no sense at home in North Carolina. Their attenuated
connections to the State ... fall far short of "the continuous and

systematic general business contacts" necessary to empower North
Carolina to entertain suit against them on claims unrelated to anything
that connects them to the State.75
Some commentators have argued that everything after this portion of the opinion
is dicta. 76 As demonstrated below, it is not.
Instead, later in the opinion, the majority addresses the Goodyear
respondents' primary argument 77-that the North Carolina court's reliance on
the Goodyear petitioners' participation in an ongoing, highly-integrated supply
and distribution enterprise with their corporate parent, which was based, in part,
in North Carolina-shifted the jurisdictional analysis and provided sufficient
evidence of the petitioners' substantial, continuous, and systematic activity in
North Carolina to support the exercise of general jurisdiction over the Goodyear
to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
petitioners. 78 In their Brief in Opposition
the Goodyearrespondents had argued that:
Plaintiffs are not asserting there are minimum contacts with defendants
on a 'stream of commerce' claim, in which the defendants had nothing
to do with where their product eventually ended up. Instead, plaintiffs
are alleging that the defendants are part of a highly targeted, integrated
world-wide effort to design, manufacture, market and sell their tires in
the United States, including North Carolina. Those thousands of tires
sold here are not incidental contacts, but instead are calculated and
deliberate efforts to take advantage of the North Carolina market for
tires.79

73. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
74. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
75. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416).
76. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
77. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857.
78. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 10, at 17.
79. Brief in Opposition at 4, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct.
2846 (2011) (No. 10-76) (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 541) (internal quotation marks
omitted). See also Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 n.6 (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 485)
(addressing the respondents' argument). In fact, as set forth in their Brief in Opposition to the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the Goodyear respondents noted that "[flar from attempting to apply
the stream of commerce notion to this case, one of the headings of plaintiffs' brief to the N.C. Court
of Appeals was: 'Defendants' "Stream of Commerce" Arguments Are Misdirected In That They
Refer To A Doctrine That Does Not Apply In This Case."' Brief in Opposition, supra, at 5 (quoting
Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 481).
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In rejecting the argument, the Court acknowledged that even if the Goodyear
petitioners' participation in such an enterprise did establish their substantial,
already
continuous, and systematic activity in the forum, "[als
not
justify
in
a
State
do
a
product
explained ...even regularly occurring sales of
80
sales."
those
to
unrelated
claim
a
over
jurisdiction
of
the exercise
Justice Ginsburg makes clear then that, even if a foreign corporation makes a
substantial number of sales to the forum state on a very continuous and
systematic basis, as the Goodyear petitioners did here, those facts alone would81
not support the exercise of general jurisdiction over such a corporation.
Something more was now required. And that is where the essentially at home
standard comes into play. Without it, the Court would arguably have been hardpressed to deny that Goodyear's integrated, ongoing supply and distribution
petitioners were an
scheme operating in the forum, of which the Goodyear
82
integral part, was continuous and highly systematic.
The Court's opinion is also noteworthy for what it did not do. Inexplicably,
the Court expressly refused to consider an argument that the Goodyear
respondents never actually made, that is, because of the Goodyear petitioners'
participation in the Goodyear supply and distribution enterprise, the Court itself

80. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 n.6. See also id. at 2856 ("A corporation's 'continuous
activity of some sorts within a state.., is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be
amenable to suits unrelated to that activity."' (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
318 (1945))).
81. Justice Ginsburg's conclusion that the more than 44,000 tires sold in North Carolina
during the relevant period were insignificant for jurisdictional purposes stands in stark contrast to
her statement, in dissent, in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (201 1), that:
"The plurality notes the low volume of sales in New Jersey .... Had a manufacturer sold in New
Jersey $24,900 worth of flannel shirts, cigarette lighters, or wire-rope splices, the Court would
presumably find the defendant amendable to suit in that State." Id. at 2803 n.15 (citations omitted).
82. This is particularly true if the Court had used the definitions supplied by the Government
in Goodyear. The Government posited:
Taken together, Perkins and Helicopteros establish that the relevant inquiry is
whether "the foreign corporation, through its [agent] 'ha[s] been carrying on in [the
forum State] a continuous and systematic.., part of its general business,"' typified by
the Ohio activities of the foreign corporation in Perkins. That test is demanding. In
particular:
"Continuous" refers to a practice "[o]perated without interruption." Thus, the "one
trip to Houston by Helicol's chief executive officer" could not "be described or
regarded as a contact of a 'continuous and systematic' nature."
"Systematic" refers to conduct "that forms a system," which is an
*
"aggregation... of objects united by some form of regular action or
interdependence." Thus, in Perkins ....what mattered was that the corporation's
contacts with Ohio-banking, employment, recordkeeping, holding office space,
conducting corporate affairs, etc.,-together formed the very embodiment of the
defendant's corporate control structure.
Brief for the United States, supra note 64, at 22-23 (alterations in original) (quoting WEBSTER'S
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 577, 2562 (2d. ed. 1958);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415,416 (1984)).
*
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should pierce the corporate veil or declare that the scheme constituted a single

business enterprise for jurisdictional purposes.8 3 The Court, however, did not
need to go so far and was not asked to do so, in lare part because the lower
By characterizing the
courts had already essentially made such a finding.

83. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (citing SUP. CT. R. 15.2; Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2861 (2010); Brief for Respondents, supra note 10, at 44). In holding
that any question regarding the existence of a single business enterprise had somehow been waived,
the Court seemingly ignored the well-established rule that a judgment may be affirmed on any
ground supported by the law and record and the record in the trial and appellate courts below. See
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 n.6 (1982) (citing United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159,
166 n.8 (1977); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475 n.6 (1970); Ryerson v. United States,
312 U.S. 405, 408 (1941)). Even the Government admitted in its amicus brief that the North
Carolina Court of Appeals had "effectively treat[ed] the parent and subsidiary corporations as an
undifferentiated entity for distribution of petitioners' products." Brief for the United States, supra
note 64, at 27. In fact, as demonstrated above, both North Carolina courts repeatedly raised and
relied upon the Goodyear integrated business structure as a basis for jurisdiction. See supra Part
I.B-C.
In finding waiver, the Court also stated that the issue of consideration of the parents' contacts
as part of the Goodyear distribution system had been raised only in respondents' Brief to the North
Carolina Court of Appeals. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 n.6 (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 9,
at 485). That is incorrect. Aside from the many references in the court of appeals' decision, the
same argument was included in the Brief in Opposition, supra note 79, at 4 (citing Joint Appendix,
supra note 9), which arguably preserved the issue. Supreme Court Rule 15.2, cited by the Court as
warranting waiver, Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (citing Sup. CT. R. 15.2), addresses only the need
to correct misstatements of fact or law in the petition for certiorari. See SUP. CT. R. 15.2. As a
result, the rule is either irrelevant to this issue or was satisfied by the statement cited in the text
above.
84. Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 395 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), discretionary appeal not
allowed, 695 S.E.2d 756 (N.C. 2010), rev'd sub nom. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). This is true despite the language, quoted in the opinion, that the
Court interpreted as meaning that the North Carolina Court of Appeals somehow found that the
Goodyear petitioners and their corporate parent were separate corporate entities. Goodyear, 131 S.
Ct. at 2857 (citing Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 392). It did not. To the contrary, the actual quote refers
only to the court's reading of the evidence supporting the trial court's decision and notes that the
Goodyear subsidiaries as among themselves were "separate corporate entities" that did not
themselves ship or sell products in North Carolina. Brown, 681 S.E. 2d at 392. It said nothing
about their joint involvement with their corporate parent. See id. A few paragraphs down in the
opinion, however, the North Carolina court put such evidence in context:
According to the trial court's findings, the distribution chain through which tires
manufactured by Defendants were shipped into the United States and, eventually, into
North Carolina, was "a continuous and systematic" process rather than a sporadic or
episodic one. As a result, the trial court's findings indicated that, through a regular
process employed within the Goodyear organization, a substantial number of tires
manufactured by the Defendants were imported into the United States and distributed to
various entities in North Carolina.
Id. at 394 (emphasis added). Finally, as the Government recognized, when the court of appeals
made its holding, it found that:
Although we might agree with Defendants' contention in the event that the record
demonstrated that only a few tires reached North Carolina through a limited distribution
process, that is not the situation present here. Instead, the trial court's findings reflect
that thousands of tires manufactured by each of the Defendants were distributed in North
Carolina as the result of a highly organizeddistributionprocess that involved Defendants
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argument as it did and by finding that argument waived, however, the Court was
able to avoid deciding it.
Consideration of that argument or one like it, however, would have
permitted the Court to determine whether a corporate subsidiary would be
considered essentially at home in a jurisdiction that had general jurisdiction over
its corporate parent where the two were participants in a single business
enterprise, a determination the Court was not apparently prepared to make in the
Goodyear case. This is likely due to the fact that the issue had not been fully
briefed by petitioners or any amici and was only discussed in a footnote in the
Government's brief.85 Second, unlike a case such as Torres, the record below
was sparse, at best, even though it contained critical admissions. 86 Third, as
demonstrated below, the parallel decision in Nicastro colored any decision the
Court made and even the standard it used. As a result, it may simply be that the
Court preferred to save resolution of that question for another day and another
case where the issue was more directly and fully addressed.
The Goodyear petitioners and the Government had also asked the Court
essentially to require that a foreign corporation be somehow physically present
in the forum before its courts would be permitted to exercise general jurisdiction
The Court declined to do so. It could easily have
over that corporation.
restricted the place in which a court could exercise general jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation to the state of the corporation's princi!pal place of business or
incorporation. Indeed, it discussed just such limitations.8a Yet, it did not impose
them. As set forth below, there are good reasons why the Court imposed a
broader, more ambiguous standard instead.
B.

Originsof the "Essentially at Home" Standard

Historically, courts announcing the test for general jurisdiction have
eschewed any requirement of physical, virtual, or de facto presence of a foreign
corporation in the forum state and focused instead on whether the foreign
corporations' contacts with the forum were sufficiently continuous, systematic,
and substantial such that the exercise of general jurisdiction over that corporation
comported with due process. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,89 for

and other Goodyear affiliates. Thus, we believe that, on the facts of this case, sufficient
basis exists to support a finding of general personal jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 1-75.4(1)d and the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 394-95 (emphasis added). Nothing in the North Carolina Court of Appeals' opinion then, can
fairly be construed as concluding that the parent and Goodyear subsidiaries were separate corporate
entities for jurisdictional purposes.
85. See Brief for the United States, supra note 64, at 26 n.9.
86. See supra text accompanying note 9.
87. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 28; Brief for the United States, supra note 64, at
11.

88.
89.

Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853-54.
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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example, the Court abandoned the traditional jurisdictional requirement of
physical presence in the forum state and concluded that jurisdiction over foreign
corporations in the forum was appropriate "when the activities of the corporation
there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the
liabilities sued on."9 Although InternationalShoe arose out of attempts by the
State of Washington to collect deficiencies in payments to its unemployment
compensation fund for salesmen employed by the Missouri-based company in
Washington, 9 1 the Court also announced the jurisdictional yardstick to be used
when claims arise outside the forum. The Court stated:
While it has been held ... that continuous activity of some sorts within
a state is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be
amendable to suits unrelated to that activity, there have been instances
in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought
so substantialand of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes
92
of action arisingfrom dealings entirely distinctfrom those activities.

The Court reaffirmed and extended these principles in Perkins v. Benguet
Consolidated. Mining Co.93 A nonresident brought suit in Ohio against a
Philippine corporation that had been "carrying on in Ohio a continuous and
systematic, but limited, part of its general business" during World War II, for
claims arising from its activities unrelated to Ohio.94 Although the corporation
had never been licensed to do business in Ohio or appointed an agent for service
there, 95 produced nothing there, and never sold any products there, the Court did
not find those markers "a conclusive test." 96 Instead, the question was "whether,
as a matter of federal due process, the business done in Ohio by the... mining
company was sufficiently substantial and of such a nature
97 as to permit Ohio to
entertain a cause of action against a foreign corporation."
In Perkins, the corporation had no office or ongoing mining operations in
Ohio. 98 Instead, the company's president and principal shareholder had a
personal office in which he conducted his personal affairs, some activities on the
company's behalf, and kept the company's files. 99 He conducted some company
correspondence and drew salary checks in Ohio, using two local banks that held
company funds. to An Ohio bank acted as transfer agent for Benguet's stock and

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 317 (citations omitted).
Id. at 311,313-14.
Id. at 318 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
342 U.S. 437 (1952).
Id. at 438-39.
See id. at 439 & n.2, 448.
Id. at 445.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 447-48.
Id. at 448.
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t
0'
the president held a few board meetings at his home or office in Ohio.
Finally, the president oversaw the rehabilitation of the company's mining
operations in the Philippines from his office in Ohio. 102 On these facts, the Court
found that "he carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic supervision of the
necessarily limited wartime activities of the company" such that "it would not
violate federal due process for 1Ohio
either to take or decline jurisdiction of the
03
corporation in this proceeding."'
In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall,1°4 the only other general
jurisdiction case decided by the Court, it evaluated whether Helicol had the
"continuous and systematic general business contacts [with the forum] that the
10 5
Court found to exist in Perkins."'

Although business practices have grown more complex since Perkins was
decided in 1952, its principle-that supervision of business activities from the
forum may be sufficient alone to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction over
foreign corporations'°6-has remained intact. Justices Brennan and Marshall, in
their dissenting and concurring opinions in Helicopteros, World-Wide
Volkswagen,10 7 and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,t01 anticipated
that the Court would examine the business context in which a defendant's
contacts with the forum arise.1t 9 In Burger King, 10° the majority did just that.
"We have previously noted that when commercial activities are 'carried on in
behalf of an out-of-state party those activities may sometimes be ascribed to the
party, at least where he is a 'primary participant[t]' in the enterprise and has
Because the case could be
acted purposefully in directing those activities.""'
decided on other issues, however,
the
Court
declined
to "resolve the permissible
' 2
attribution."
such
of
bounds
These cases demonstrate what had been the Court's increasing
understanding that the nature and complexity of the businesses in which
purported contacts arise is critical to its jurisdictional inquiry, particularly where
multinational corporations are concerned.
In fact, the Court's recent
jurisprudence had reflected the Court's apparent conclusion that traditional

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
466 U.S. 408 (1984).
Id. at 416.

106. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448.
107. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
108. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
109. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 480 U.S. at 314 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing
how jurisdiction should not take for granted the defendants' decision to participate in a global
automobile enterprise).
110. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
111. Id. at 479 n.22 (alteration in original) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 320 (1945); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984)).
112. Id.
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notions of jurisdiction may sometimes have limited application to modern
transnational commerce.
In Hertz Corp. v. Friend,13 for example, the Court recognized that even a
term such as "principal place of business,
a staple of traditional jurisdictional
inquiries, may have a very different meaning in the context of modern corporate
governance. In Hertz, consistent with the Perkins' holding that supervision may
give rise to jurisdiction," 5 the Court stated:
We conclude that "principal place of business" is best read as referring
to the place where a corporation's officers direct, control, and
coordinate the corporation's activities. It is the place that Courts of
Appeals have called the corporation's "nerve center." And in practice it
should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its
headquarters-provided that the headquarters is the actual center of
direction, control, and coordination, i.e., the "nerve center," and not
simply an office where the corporation holds its board meetings (for
example, attended
6 by directors and officers who have traveled there for
the occasion). 1
This test, and its exception, also seem to vindicate Justice Breyer's conclusion
that "[i]f InternationalShoe stands for anything... it is that a truly interstate [or
international] business may not shield
' 17itself from suit by a careful but formalistic
structuring of its business dealings." "
Similarly, in the plurality decision in Nicastro, which was argued along with
Goodyear and decided the same day, Justices Breyer and Alito, in concurrence,
also warned the Court against announcing broad, immutable rules in the face of
rapidly changing commercial realities. They explained:
The plurality seems to state strict rules that limit jurisdiction where a
defendant does not "inten[d] to submit to the power of a sovereign" and
cannot "be said to have targeted the forum." But what do those
standards mean when a company targets the world by selling products
from its Web site? And does it matter if, instead of shipping the
products directly, a company consigns the products through an
intermediary (say, Amazon.com) who then receives and fulfills the

113. 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010).
114. Id. at 1192 (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. See supra text accompanying note 103.
116. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1193. The Court explained that "[a] 'nerve center' approach, which
ordinarily equates that 'center' with a corporation's headquarters, is simple to apply comparatively
speaking. The metaphor of a corporate 'brain,' while not precise, suggests a single location." Id. at
1193.
117. Benitez-Allende v. Alcan Aluminio do Brasil, S.A., 857 F.2d 26, 30 (lst Cir. 1988) (first
alteration in original) (quoting Vencedor Mfg. Co. v. Gougler Indus., Inc., 557 F.2d 886, 891 (lst
Cir. 1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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orders? And what if the company markets its products through popup
advertisements that it knows will be viewed in a forum? Those issues
have serious commercial consequences but are totally absent in this
118
case.

It is, therefore, not surprising that Justice Ginsburg, in crafting the
"essentially at home" language in Goodyear, allowed for considerable flexibility
to permit the Court, in the future, to apply the standard as corporate structures
and means of commerce evolve. It would have made no sense for the Court to
have applied the rigid standard urged by the petitioners in Goodyear, restrictingA
general jurisdiction to principal place of business or state of incorporation,'
only to have that rigid standard completely undercut by the flexible definition of

the term "principal place of business" in Hertz.120 Moreover, the concurrence
could hardly announce in Nicastro that a rigid rule is improper because of
evolving corporate structures and then impose just such a rigid rule in Goodyear
the same day.
It is also not surprising that in announcing the essentially at home standard
not as something new but as the traditional standard employed to determine
general jurisdiction, the Court apparently focused on the supervisory aspect of
Perkins, which, in modern parlance, would have allowed a court to exercise
general jurisdiction where the corporate "brain" resides."' Justice Ginsburg's
opinion for the Court, then, can fairly be read as an effort to reconcile Goodyear
and the Hertz line of decisions.

118. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (alteration in original).
119. See supra text accompanying note 3.
120. See Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1192. As the Court noted in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495
U.S. 604 (1990), a case involving "tag" jurisdiction over a nonresident individual, physical presence
in the forum has never been an effective yardstick to determine personal jurisdiction over
corporations:
It may be that whatever special rule exists permitting "continuous and systematic"
contacts to support jurisdiction with respect to matters unrelated to activity in the forum
applies only to corporations, which have never fitted comfortably in a jurisdictional
regime based primarily upon "de facto power over the defendant's person."
Id. at 610 n.1 (second emphasis added) (quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S.
437, 438 (1952); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). See also Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 203 (1977) (citing Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317) (stating that "the inquiry into
the State's jurisdiction over a foreign corporation appropriately focused not on whether the
corporation was 'present,"' but whether there were sufficient contacts such that it was reasonable
for the defendant to be haled into the forum state).
121. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2856 (2011)
(citing Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48); supra note 116.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2012

21

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 13

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 63: 697

C. The Nicastro Opinion
The Court granted certiorari in Goodyear and Nicastro on the same day and
ordered that they be argued on the same day.122 The opinions in the two cases
were also issued at the same time, the very last day of the Court's 2010-2011
Term. 123 Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion in Goodyear and a lengthy
dissent in Nicastro. 24 As a result, as demonstrated below, the outcome in
Goodyear,while not technically a companion case to Nicastro, was nevertheless
always dependent in very large part on the latter's outcome. It would, therefore,
be a grievous mistake to read and attempt to interpret the Goodyear decision
without reference to the plurality decision in Nicastro.
In Nicastro, "[a] foreign industrialist [sought] to develop a market in the
' 25
United States for the [large metal shearing] machines it manufacture[d]."'
Targeting the entire United States with the goal of selling as many machines as it
could, wherever it could, irrespective of where in the United States its buyers
resided, it "excluded no region or State from the market it wishe[d] to reach.
But, all things considered, it prefer[red] to avoid products liability litigation in
the United States. To that end, it engage[d] a U.S. distributor to ship its
machines stateside."' 26 By that action, a fractured plurality of the Supreme
Court held that it had succeeded in escaping personal jurisdiction in New Jersey,
27
where one of its products was sold and caused serious injury to a local user.
As discussed above, while agreeing with the majority's conclusion that the
New Jersey court's decision should be reversed, Justices Breyer and Alito
refused to embrace the sweeping rule announced by the plurality."' Three
Justices, led by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, contending that the Court's prior
precedents forbid the plurality's decision.'29
Had the Court in Nicastro held that the New Jersey courts properly exercised
jurisdiction over McIntyre, even though it utilized a U.S. distributor, it might
have been possible for the Court in Goodyear to have held that the Goodyear
petitioners' participation in an on-going, highly integrated sales and distribution
scheme commanded by their corporate parent in the forum also supported
general jurisdiction. In that event, the Court could also have simply adhered to
the traditional incarnation of the general jurisdiction test of continuous,
systematic, and substantial contacts comporting with due process.'30

122. Goodyear Lux. Tires, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 63 (2010) (granting certiorari and
referencing argument in tandem with Nicastro).
123. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2846; J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2780.
124. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850; J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
125. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. See id. at 2795.
128. See id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
129. See id. at 2794-95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945)).
130. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (citations omitted).
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When the Nicastro Court's plurality decided that specific jurisdiction over
McIntyre was improper, however, it would have been virtually impossible for
the Court to have explained how general jurisdiction was appropriate over
Goodyear subsidiaries when specific jurisdiction was not proper under a paler
version of similar facts. Moreover, when the plurality in Nicastro restricted the
test for specific jurisdiction, it was virtually inevitable that the test for general
jurisdiction would also have to give way lest the two begin to merge. This
restriction is arguably a reason for the addition of the essentially at home
language in the general jurisdiction test.
D. The Government's Position
Even the Justices of the Court were curious as to why the U.S. Government
chose to participate in Goodyear, a case involving the relatively rare exercise of
general jurisdiction, 131 and not in Nicastro, which potentially involved trillions
of dollars in international trade.132 The real answer may be found in the last
section of the Government's brief in Goodyear. The Government first
explained:
[F]oreign governments' objections to our state courts' expansive views
of general personal jurisdiction have in the past impeded negotiations of
international agreements on the reciprocal recognition and enforcement
of judgments. The conclusion of such international compacts is an
important foreign policy objective of the United States because such
agreements serve the United States' interest in providing its residents a
fair, predictable, and stable system for the resolution of disputes that
cross national boundaries. Reversal of the state court's judgment, in
accordance with this Court's precedents,
would thus serve the
33
diplomatic interests of the United States.'
In a footnote, however, the Government may have revealed the true problem and
its true interest in the case. It observed:

131. The number of actual cases in which courts have exercised general personal jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants is quite small. See, e.g., Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General
Jurisdiction, 101 HARv. L. REV. 610, 630 (1988) (counting actual cases).
132. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2799 n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES 1, 6 (Apr. 2011), available at
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/2011pr/04/ft900.pdf)
("Last year, the United
States imported nearly 2 trillion dollars in foreign goods. Capital goods, such as the metal shear
machine that injured Nicastro, accounted for almost 450 billion dollars in imports for 2010. New
Jersey is the fourth-largest destination for manufactured commodities imported into the United
States, after California, Texas, and New York.").
133. Brief for the United States, supra note 64, at 33-34 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)
(citation omitted).
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One commentator traced the prominent and contentious role that
United States assertions of general jurisdiction played in the Hague
Conference: "Most delegations focused on jurisdictional rules they
believed went too far, were 'exorbitant,' and thus should be placed on
the prohibited list of Article

18(e) ... [Gleneral doing business

jurisdiction w[as] quickly voted onto that list." Indeed, [t]he most
debated issue of allocation of jurisdiction was what to do with "doing
business" jurisdiction in U.S. law. Brussels States, in particular, wanted
it clearly ensconced on the prohibited list of Article 18(2), and that
happened in the Preliminary Draft Convention Text with the language of
Article 18(2) lit. e, which prohibits jurisdiction based solely on "the
carrying on of commercial or other activities by the defendant in [the
forum State], except where the dispute is directly related to those
activities."
This would have placed U.S. general doing business
jurisdiction on the prohibited list in all circumstances, something the
U.S. delegation had almost no hope of selling to the U.S. Senate upon
efforts for ratification if the Preliminary Draft Convention Text had
been adopted by the Hague Conference. 134
Thus, the Government faced an almost insurmountable problem: how to satisfy
its European partners who considered general "doing business" jurisdiction
exorbitant and, at the same time, maintain any hope of ratification by U.S.
Senators who were very protective of their respective state's right to assert
jurisdiction over those who do business within its borders. 35 One means of
escape was to ask the Court to find that the exercise of such jurisdiction violated
due process rights, which is precisely what the
the Goodyear petitioners'
36
Government did. 1
Yet, while the Court essentially did the Government's bidding in this regard,
it stopped short of acceding to its request to restrict general jurisdiction to the
state of incorporation or principal place of business. 13' As suggested above, the
Court may have stopped short in order to provide itself with the flexibility to
address new corporate structures in the future. Yet it may also have been saving
the Government from itself. If the exercise of general jurisdiction over foreign
corporations by state courts under the circumstances in Goodyear had been held
to violate due process, except in a state where the corporation is incorporated or
has its principal place of business, then the Court would necessarily have

134. Id. at 33-34 n.14 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Ronald A. Brand,
The 1999 Hague Preliminary Draft Convention Text on Jurisdictionand Judgments: A View from
the United States, in 61 THE HAGUE PRELIMINARY DRAFT CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND
JUDGMENTs 3, 8-9, 12 (Fausto Pocar & Costanza Honorati eds. 2005)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
135. See Brand, supra note 134, at 9.
136. See Brief for the United States, supra note 64, at 10-12.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
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courts as well under the Fifth
restricted the jurisdiction of the federal
S 138
By using the more open-ended and
Amendment's Due Process protections.
flexible essentially at home standard, the Court may also have afforded the
federal government more jurisdictional flexibility as well.
E. Will the Supreme Court Find General Jurisdiction Under an Enterprise
Theory After Goodyear?
In Goodyear, the Court expressly left open the question of whether an
enterprise theory would satisfy the requirements of its essentially at home
general jurisdiction standard. A review of the Court's prior jurisprudence,
however, reveals that when it addresses this issue in the future-and it almost
certainly will do so-it will likely find that such theories do satisfy the Goodyear
test.
As discussed above, starting with International Shoe, the Supreme Court
embraced the idea of attribution or merger for jurisdictional purposes of local
corporate activities and those of foreign corporations or subsidiaries. 139 In
Perkins, as in Goodyear, the Philippine mining company engaged in no
Instead, the Court
manufacturing or actual production in the forum state.
upheld the assertion of general jurisdiction over Benguet because its president

138. Due process and "[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as
that under the Fourteenth Amendment." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (per curiam)
(citing Weinberger v, Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975)); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213-18 (1995) (citations omitted) (discussing the "general rule" that the equal
protection analysis of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are the same). Nevertheless, in
attempting to insulate its own ability to seek general jurisdiction over foreign corporations, the
Government argued that:
The United States also has an interest in ensuring that claims under federal law,
brought in courts of the United States, are not unduly constrained by a minimum contacts
analysis that is narrowly focused on a particular State instead of the Nation as a whole.
Such interests are not directly implicated by this Court's interpretation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, because that constitutional provision
applies only to the conduct of state governments and officials. In prior cases, this Court
has appropriately reserved the question whether "a federal court could exercise personal
jurisdiction, consistent with the Fifth Amendment, based on an aggregation of the
defendant's contacts with the Nation as a whole, rather than on its contacts with the State
in which the federal court sits."
Brief for the United States, supra note 64, at 28-29 (citation omitted) (quoting Omni Capital Int'l,
Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987)). It is unclear whether this distinction
would protect federal jurisdiction in non-commercial areas, such as certain anti-terrorism and
money-laundering cases, or others outside areas of unique federal interest.
139. See Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 49, at 2. The Court has never allowed the so-called
Cannon principle to stand in the way of the assertion of general jurisdiction in the face of highlyintegrated business enterprises. See id. at 3-4. In Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing
Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925), the Court held that a subsidiary's business in the forum, without more,
did not automatically constitute its parent's "doing business" there so as to warrant an inference that
the parent was present there. Id. at 336-37.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
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had engaged in "continuous
and systematic supervision" of the company's
141
activities from the forum.
Moreover, the Court has repeatedly held that it does not offend due process
considerations to impose liability on or exercise jurisdiction over corporations
that are part of functionally-integrated business enterprises. The Court has long
employed the 'unitary-business"' doctrine to find that it is acceptable to tax
local affiliates of American multinational corporations. 42 Similarly, the
National Labor Relations Board has developed, and this Court has upheld use of,
an "integrated enterprise" or "single employer" doctrine in labor and
employment discrimination cases. 143 In fact, one Third Circuit panel recently
observed that:
Since its initial formulation, the [integrated enterprise] test has been
applied by courts in other employment contexts, including the Labor
Management Relations Act; Title VII and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act; the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Fair
Labor Standards Act. Department of Labor regulations have also
adopted the integrated enterprise test for the Family Medical Leave
Act. "
While there are sound policy reasons in these areas of the law that may have led
to these decisions, the Court's overriding determination that holding foreign
corporations accountable under such circumstances does not offend due process
considerations augurs well for a decision that would allow the exercise of
general jurisdiction under an enterprise theory.
For all of these reasons, it is not surprising that, in numerous cases decided
after Goodyear, circuit and trial courts have discussed variations on enterprise
and agency theories in determining whether the exercise of general jurisdiction

141. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952) (emphasis added).
142. See Exxon Corp. v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 223 (1980) (quoting and citing
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437
U.S. 267, 273 (1978)); see also Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of
MultinationalCorporations,15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 354 (1990).
143. See Radio & Television Broad. Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broad. Serv. of Mobile,
Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965) (per curiam) (citing 21 NLRB ANN. REP. 14-15 (1956)); Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters Local 952 v. Am. Delivery Serv. Co., 50 F.3d 770, 776 (9th Cir. 1995); Stephen F.
Befort, Labor Law and the Double-BreastedEmployer: A Critique of the Single Employer and Alter
Ego Doctrines and a Proposed Reformulation, 1987 WIS. L. REv. 67, 75; Blumberg, supra note
142, at 355-58 (citations omitted).
144. Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 486 (3rd Cir. 2001) (citations
omitted). The Fair Labor Standards Act defines an "enterprise" as "the related activities performed
(either through unified operation or common control) by any person or persons for the common
business purpose, and includes all such activities whether performed in one or more establishments
or by one or more corporate or other organizational units." Blumberg, supra note 142, at 358
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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over foreign corporations was proper. On that basis, some courts have permitted
the exercise of general jurisdiction.
In Colo'n v. Akil, 45 for example, Ms. Colo'n argued that the presence of
CBS Corporation in Indiana conferred jurisdiction over CBS Studios, a corporate
affiliate. 146 The court rejected her argument only "because personal jurisdiction
cannot be premised on corporate affiliation alone when, as Judge Hamilton
found, CBS Studios and CBS Corporation exist as separate entities."
In Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 14 8 the panel found that general
jurisdiction over Daimler could be asserted under an agency test. 149 That test has
two requirements:
First, the subsidiary's services must be "sufficiently important to [the
parent] that they would almost certainly be performed by other means if
[the subsidiary] did not exist, whether by [the parent] performing those
services itself or by [the parent] entering into an agreement with a new
subsidiary or a non-subsidiary national distributor for the performance
of those services." Second, it must be shown that the 5parent has "the
right to substantially control" the subsidiary's activities. 0
Finally, in Francis v. Bridgestone Corp.,15 1 the court analyzed in detail the
evidence allegedly supporting the exercise of general jurisdiction over the
defendant in the U.S. Virgin Islands under a theory of control by its corporate
parent. 152 The court ultimately found, however, that the plaintiff had not
"plausibly alleged" nor proved such control.' 53
It should be clear then, that there does not appear to be a significant legal
impediment to the use of an enterprise theory to satisfy the jurisdictional
requirements set forth in Goodyear, and many reasons exist as to why the use of
such a theory would be consistent with prior Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Nor are there any sound policy reasons to avoid its use. There is no apparent
foreign policy impediment to the Court's allowing the assertion of general
jurisdiction on some sort of enterprise theory. An expert group at the Hague
negotiations proposed that the rules for disregarding the independent legal
personality of a subsidiary or parent be left to the national law of each

145. 449 F. App'x 511 (7th Cir. 2011).
146. Id. at 514.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. 644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011).
149. Id. at 912, 920-21.
150. Order Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., (No.
07-15386), 2011 WL 5402020, at *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 9, 2011) (O'Scannlain, J. dissenting)
(alterations in original) (quoting Bauman, 644 F.3d at 922, 924) (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. No. 2010/30, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72804 (D.V.I. July 12, 2011).
152. Id. at *29-43 (citations omitted).
153. Id. at *45.
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contracting state.' 54 Likewise, nothing in Nicastro seems to prevent the use of
some variation on enterprise theory to establish general jurisdiction, in part
because, as the Government admitted in Goodyear, the jurisdictional analysis
changes under such circumstances. 155
Moreover, permitting the exercise of general jurisdiction under such a theory
is unlikely to cause the ills the Goodyear petitioners threatened would occur if
the decision in Goodyearwas not reversed. 56 This is, in large part, because "the
'unitary business' standard turning on 'functional integration' imposes relatively
tight boundaries to define the type of multinational enterprise that are included,

and is limited to particular models of managerial direction and of economic
integration."1 57 Thus, its use is unlikely to cause a feared flood of cases.
Trial courts also have adequate tools to prevent threatened forum-shoPRing.
In Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia InternationalShipping Corp.,

the

Court held that courts may dispose of actions by forum non conveniens dismissal
first, "bypassing questions of... personal jurisdiction, when considerations of
convenience, fairness, and judicial economy so warrant."' 59 The Supreme Court
has also held that a foreign plaintiffs choice of forum deserves much less
deference in deciding such motions. 160
Most states also have venue rules that restrict suits against outsiders. 161
Choice-of-law principles also strongly influence where and whether certain
claims may be pursued.162 As one commentator noted, if one forum attempts to
use "an idiosyncratic and expansive attribution or merger rule in the context of
the jurisdictional determination,
it involves a choice of law decision that must
163
pass muster like any other."'
The purported advantages of restricting general jurisdiction even over single
business enterprises may also be overstated. While corporate fragmentation may
provide corporations themselves with certain other advantages,' 64 viewed in
broader economic terms, limiting corporate tort liability is not necessarily a
universal good. By creating small and relatively judgment-proof subsidiaries,
corporations externalize the risks associated with producing defective or

154. See CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW,
INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS

37 n. 151 (1997) (Prelim. Doc. No. 7), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm-pd7.pdf.
155. See Brief for the United States, supra note 64, at 26 n.9.
156. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 41-45.
157. Blumberg, supra note 142, at 355 (emphasis added).
158. 549 U.S. 422 (2007).
159. Id. at 432.
160. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981).
161. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-80 (2011).
162. See, e.g., Lindsay Traylor Braunig, Statutory Interpretation in a Choice of Law Context,
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1050, 1050 (2005) ("[C]hoice of law affects forum shopping and class action
strategy.").
163. Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 49, at 36-37.
164. See Blumberg, supra note 142, at 328 n.181
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dangerous products. 165 All corporate benefits thus come at the expense of
victims, taxpayers (through social insurance programs), and third-party insurers.
In fact, "[s]uch
166 externalization of costs is almost universally regarded as highly

undesirable."

Because risk-shifting lowers or eliminates the actual cost of negligent
behavior, eliminating or shifting tort liability may also cause corporations to lose
powerful economic incentives to produce safer products. 167 Thus, dangerous
behavior is not sufficiently deterred. In fact, one commentator has suggested
that the loss of limited tort liability resulting from merging one corporation's
activities with those of a constituent corporation would be advantageous.
[T]here is widespread agreement that just such an elimination of limited
liability would be an advantageous development. The group would then
be responsible for all costs of the enterprise being conducted by it and
the group would lose its present capacity to externalize some of its costs
by limiting its liability for torts of constituent companies. Such a

change would dispose of one of the principal criticisms of the
economists with respect to limited liability. Further, the availability of
insurance for such increased tort exposure provides a ready means for
the group to restrict its exposure.168

For all of these reasons, it appears that, should the Supreme Court have the
opportunity to decide the issue, 169 the Court will find that enterprise theories can

be used to satisfy its newly announced essentially at home test for general
jurisdiction over foreign corporations and afford such corporations a

165. See id. at 370.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Schafer v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 20 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1994) (Breyer, J.)("[T]he
[National Childhood Vaccine Injury] Act modifies, but does not eliminate, the traditional tort
system, which Congress understood to provide important incentives for the safe manufacture and
distribution of [products].").
168. Blumberg, supra note 142, at 342 (citation omitted).
169. Congress could also render the Goodyear decision essentially moot. There is pending in
Congress legislation that would require foreign corporations that do business in states to submit to
the general jurisdiction of such states. Senate Bill 1946, the Foreign Manufacturers Legal
Accountability Act of 2011, was introduced in December 2011 and enjoys rare bipartisan support.
157 CONG. REC. S8186-87 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 2011) (introduction of the bill). According to its
official summary, the bill directs the Food and Drug Administration (with respect to drugs, devices,
cosmetics, and biological products), the Consumer Product Safety Commission (with respect to
consumer products), and the Environmental Protection Agency (with respect to chemical
substances, new chemical substances, and pesticides) to require foreign manufacturers and
producers of such products (or components used to manufacture them), in excess of a minimum
value or quantity, to establish a registered agent in the United States authorized to accept service of
process on their behalf for the purpose of any state or federal regulatory proceeding or civil action in
state or federal court. It then deems a foreign manufacturer or producer of products covered under
the Act that registers an agent to consent to the personal jurisdiction of the state or federal courts of
the state in which the agent is located for the purpose of any civil or regulatory proceeding.
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jurisdictional "home" in the forum. It may well get that chance quite soon. A
petition for writ of certiorari was filed in Bauman v. DaimlerChryslerCorp., in
which the Ninth Circuit panel found general jurisdiction over a German
corporation in 170
California through its California-based subsidiary based on an
agency theory.
IV. CONCLUSION

Viewed against the backdrop of its facts, Supreme Court jurisprudence, the
parallel decision in Nicastro, and the Government's influence, the Supreme
Court's decision in Goodyear represents a predictable, necessary, and
incremental step in the Court's continuing efforts to keep jurisdictional rules in
line with the realities of modern transnational commerce, and not merely a
rehash of a fairly straight-forward rule prohibiting the exercise of general
jurisdiction based upon stream-of-commerce analysis.
Choosing an open-ended and amorphous standard for the exercise of such
jurisdiction instead of the rigid one urged by the Goodyear petitioners, the
Court's ruling permits the exercise of general jurisdiction over evolving and
ever-more-complex corporate forms on a variety of grounds, using a variety of
plus factors, the sum of which would lead the Court to conclude that a foreign
corporation is essentially at home in the forum, without the need to rewrite the
standard every time the Court is faced with a new corporate creation. It also
allows the Court to take into account a host of plus factors, far too lengthy to list,
and to give them different weight in different circumstances in making
jurisdictional determinations. In this regard, the standard is much like the
intentionally vague definition of "obscenity" in Jacobellis v. Ohio---"I know it
when I see it.'
What the standard lacks in predictability, it more than makes
up for in flexibility. Ultimately, the latter concern apparently carried the day in
Goodyear.
Moreover, by expressly reserving the question of whether enterprise theories
would support general jurisdiction under this standard, the Court may have
signaled that such theories are one means to satisfy the essentially at home test
and that it awaits another case, with a more fully developed record and no
companion case to complicate or restrict its ruling, in which to make that
determination. As demonstrated above, finding general jurisdiction on such

170. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, (No. 11-965),
available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.comwp-content/uploads/2012/02/Bauman-Final-Petitionfor-Certiorari.pdf; supra text accompanying notes 148-149. Apparently recognizing the opening
the Court left in Goodyear, in his question presented, former Solicitor General Ted Olson took pains
to mention that "[it is undisputed that Daimler AG and its U.S. subsidiary adhere to all the legal
requirements necessary to maintain their separate corporate identities." Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, supra, at i.
171. 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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grounds is consistent with past Supreme Court precedent. Indeed, there are no

sound policy reasons not to permit it.
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